Optimal Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Double Auction

Author

Yin, Hong ; Wang, Xian-jia

Author_Institution

Sch. of Bus., East China Normal Univ., Shanghai

fYear

2006

fDate

13-16 Aug. 2006

Firstpage

207

Lastpage

212

Abstract

This paper aims at designing a mechanism for multi-objective double auction, which can clear market, satisfy budget restriction, be incentive compatible and maximize the revenue of both sides of buyer and seller. In virtue of the idea of Myerson´s mechanism design, this paper first establishes a double auction model that can be regarded as a multi-objective and multi-restrictions optimization problem. By solving this problem, we get the optimal auction mechanism. Further, we make numeral analysis and discuss for the allocation efficiency of this mechanism

Keywords

budgeting; commerce; marketing; operations research; optimisation; Myerson mechanism design; budget restriction; market clearing; multiobjective double auction model; multirestriction optimization problem; optimal auction mechanism design; revenue maximization; Costs; Cybernetics; Design engineering; Design optimization; Earth; Forward contracts; Linear programming; Machine learning; Marketing and sales; Production; Risk analysis; Systems engineering and theory; Double auction; allocation efficiency; incentive compatibility; mechanism design;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 2006 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Dalian, China

Print_ISBN

1-4244-0061-9

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICMLC.2006.258955

Filename

4028060