Title :
A Game Analysis of the Supervision Model for Preventing Tunneling Behavior in China´s Family Firms
Author :
Shen Minghao ; Tang Jing
Author_Institution :
Center for Cantonese Merchants Res., Guangdong Univ. of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China
Abstract :
Recently, it has become a hot issue to prevent the controlling family from tunneling listed companies. This paper aims to apply the analytical framework of the collusion theory to conduct the research onto the tunneling behavior in family firms. With the use of game theory, a supervision model for preventing tunneling behavior is established and some countermeasures are proposed.
Keywords :
behavioural sciences; game theory; small-to-medium enterprises; China family firm; collusion theory; game analysis; game theory; listed companies; supervision model; tunneling behavior prediction; Companies; Economics; Games; Inspection; Security; Tunneling; Family Firms; Game Analysis; Supervision Model;
Conference_Titel :
Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE), 2011 Fourth International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-1541-9
DOI :
10.1109/BIFE.2011.5
