Game Equilibrium and Countermeasures of Knowledge-sharing Enterprises Under Repeated Gaming and Market Supervision

The knowledge-sharing between enterprise and customer will effectively help to resolve the problems such as strategic adjustment, market risks and organizational performance under customer orientation. In order to study the interest driving of enterprise knowledge-sharing and the tactic choice under market supervision, the paper, through establishing the research hypothesis for game analysis, explores the repeated gaming between knowledge-sharing enterprise and customer as well as benefits changes and game equilibrium tactics in a supervisor sequential gaming context. The analysis results of benefits matrix show that, only when benefits of unlimited knowledge-sharing gaming are superior to that of limited knowledge-sharing gaming, the enterprise will be interested in continuing the knowledge-sharing. It is especially the case that under market supervision enterprise´s knowledge will be a voluntary act. In order to efficiently upgrade enterprise´s knowledge-sharing ability, enterprises should pay close attention to the optimization of knowledge transfer process, to the establishment of knowledge warning system, and respond actively to the market supervision.