Title :
Local dynamics for network formation games
Author :
Arcaute, Esteban ; Johari, Ramesh ; Mannor, Shie
Author_Institution :
Inst. for Comput. & Math. Eng., Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA
Abstract :
Network formation games capture two conflicting objectives of self-interested nodes in a network. On one hand, such a node wishes to be able to reach all other nodes in the network; on the other hand, it wishes to minimize its cost of participation. We focus on myopic dynamics in a class of such games inspired by transportation and communication models. A key property of the dynamics we study is that they are local: nodes can only deviate to form links with others in a restricted neighborhood. Despite this locality, we find that our dynamics converge to efficient or nearly efficient outcomes in a range of settings of interest.
Keywords :
game theory; local dynamics; myopic dynamics; network formation games; self-interested nodes; Contracts; Costs; Engineering management; Game theory; IP networks; Nash equilibrium; Peer to peer computing; Telecommunication traffic; Traffic control; Transportation;
Conference_Titel :
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
Conference_Location :
Urbana-Champaign, IL
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2925-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2926-4
DOI :
10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797658
