DocumentCode :
2947135
Title :
The shapley value: Its use and implications on internet economics
Author :
Ma, Richard T B ; Lui, John C S ; Chiu, Dah-Ming ; Misra, Vishal ; Rubenstein, Dan
Author_Institution :
Columbia Univ., New York, NY
fYear :
2008
fDate :
23-26 Sept. 2008
Firstpage :
1094
Lastpage :
1096
Abstract :
The Internet is composed of thousand of autonomous Internet Service Providers (ISPs). On the one hand, they cooperate with one another to provide services for their customers; on the other hand, they compete with each other by using selfish routing and interconnecting strategies to maximize their own profits. Currently, ISPs use bilateral settlements to decide the financial compensation one ISP pays to another. However, without an appropriate settlement model, ISPs disputes might lead to disgraceful consequences. For example, Level 3 unilaterally terminated its ldquosettlement freerdquo peering relationship with Cogent on October 5, 2005. This disruption resulted in at least 15% of the Internet to be unreachable for the users who utilized either Level 3 or Cogent for Internet access. Although both companies restored peering connections several days later with a new ongoing negotiation, Level 3´s move against Cogent exhibited an escalation of the tension that necessitates a new settlement for ISPs.
Keywords :
Internet; economics; game theory; Internet Service Providers; Internet economics; Shapley value; cooperative game solution; financial compensation; Equations; Microprocessors; Operating systems; Routing; Web and internet services;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
Conference_Location :
Urbana-Champaign, IL
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2925-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2926-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797681
Filename :
4797681
Link To Document :
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