• DocumentCode
    29564
  • Title

    An effective differential fault analysis on the Serpent cryptosystem in the Internet of Things

  • Author

    Li Wei ; Tao Zhi ; Gu Dawu ; Sun Li ; Qu Bo ; Liu Zhiqiang ; Liu Ya

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Technol., Donghua Univ., Shanghai, China
  • Volume
    11
  • Issue
    6
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    Jun-14
  • Firstpage
    129
  • Lastpage
    139
  • Abstract
    Due to the strong attacking ability, fast speed, simple implementation and other characteristics, differential fault analysis has become an important method to evaluate the security of cryptosystem in the Internet of Things. As one of the AES finalists, the Serpent is a 128-bit Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) cryptosystem. It has 32 rounds with the variable key length between 0 and 256 bits, which is fexible to provide security in the Internet of Things. On the basis of the byte-oriented model and the differential analysis, we propose an effective differential fault attack on the Serpent cryptosystem. Mathematical analysis and simulating experiment show that the attack could recover its secret key by introducing 48 faulty ciphertexts. The result in this study describes that the Serpent is vulnerable to differential fault analysis in detail. It will be benefcial to the analysis of the same type of other iterated cryptosystems.
  • Keywords
    Internet of Things; computer network security; mathematical analysis; private key cryptography; Internet of Things; SPN cryptosystem; Serpent cryptosystem; byte-oriented model; cryptosystem security; differential fault analysis; differential fault attack; faulty ciphertexts; mathematical analysis; secret key recovery; substitution-permutation network cryptosystem; word length 0 bit to 256 bit; Educational institutions; Encryption; Internet of Things; Schedules; cryptanalysis; differential fault analysis; internet of things; serpent;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Communications, China
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1673-5447
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/CC.2014.6879011
  • Filename
    6879011