Study on cooperative strategy between express company and specialized transportation enterprise

Since express service is sensitive to time demand, it´s imperative for express company to control transportation chain through efficient institutional arrangement so as to provide customer with high-quality package or document delivery. Abundant uncertainty exists in realistic social economic system, furthermore, decision-making bodies are with bounded ration. Therefore, there is no one and only rule or institutional arrangement for the transaction relationship between express company and specialized transportation enterprise. Thus, during the evolutionary process of interactive game between express company and specialized transportation enterprise, how do the parties (numerous express companies and specialized transportation enterprises) carry out strategic choice and adjustment? Is there any stable equilibrium point during such process? The paper analyzes the interactive process between express company and specialized transportation enterprise based on evolutionary game model, and find out the equilibrium stable strategy. The interactive process between express company and specialized transportation enterprise, from viewpoint of evolutionary theory, is unfolded under the framework of uncertainty and bounded ration while their strategy choices are dependent upon each other. With the change of constraint conditions, there is higher possibility for express company and specialized transportation enterprise to cooperate by contract instead of stock arrangement.