Title :
Self-Enforcing Mechanism for Relational Contract in R&D Based on GNBS
Author_Institution :
Chongqing Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Chongqing, China
Abstract :
economical contract is not very well in R&D, and relational contract is complementary for it. Self-enforcing is key point of relational contract. Repeated game is used in self-enforcing mechanism, while special invest happened before the repeated game. So self-enforcing mechanism based on repeated game could not take effect in R&D. Introduce GNBS and fixed price, build up game frame on foundation of relational contract, analysis the difference of decision in one time trade and in relational contract, put forward the condition in which the partner would choose the best investment. According to this, self-enforcing mechanism for relational contract in R&D is built up.
Keywords :
contracts; decision making; investment; microeconomics; research and development; GNBS; R&D; decision making; economical contract; investment; relational contract; self-enforcing mechanism; Contracts; Cost accounting; Games; Investments; Research and development; Supply chains; Uncertainty;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6579-8
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5997910