DocumentCode
2960519
Title
Analysis on Wage Collective Bargaining Strategy of Central Government-Owned Enterprises
Author
Zuo Chunling
Author_Institution
Labor & Personnel Dept., Beijing Wuzi Univ., Beijing, China
fYear
2011
fDate
12-14 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
5
Abstract
Wage collective bargaining provides a feasible way to establish normal wage growth mechanism. Due to factor of property rights, the wage collective talk of central government-owned enterprises is different from classical wage collective negotiation. The paper suggests establishing a two-level framework for wage collective talk. Analysis based on cooperative game theory indicates industry-level tale participated by department in charge, industry labor union and monitor is the most favorable. As for enterprise-level wage talk covered by industry-level talk, the result based on Rubinstein-Stahl Alternating Offer Mode demonstrates that counter-biding abilities of agents decides employees´ actual wage increment rate working at central enterprises with the given distributable profits.
Keywords
game theory; government; industrial property; industrial relations; salaries; Rubinstein-Stahl alternating offer mode; central government owned enterprises; cooperative game theory; distributable profits; employee wage increment rate; enterprise level wage talk; industry labor union; property rights; wage collective bargaining strategy; Contracts; Economics; Game theory; Games; Industrial relations; Industries; Monitoring;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6579-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998025
Filename
5998025
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