• DocumentCode
    2961203
  • Title

    Default Correlation and Its Effects in Logistics Service Supply Chain

  • Author

    Li, Qian ; Zhang, Shengzhong ; Wu, Qunqi

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Chang´´an Univ., Xi´´an, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    23-24 Oct. 2010
  • Firstpage
    343
  • Lastpage
    347
  • Abstract
    In order to supply integrated logistics service, Logistics Service Integrators (LSIs), as core entities in Logistics Service Supply Chains (LSSCs), often have to outsource several parts of the integrated service or functions to Functional Logistics Service Providers(FLSPs). And the outsourcing activities cause default correlation between LSIs and FLSPs. This paper establishes a capacity distribution model and a game model between two FLSPs so as to solve the problems of LSI´s order quantity optimization and FLSP´s profit optimization. Then we model the effects on LSSC caused by default correlation based on three special cases, and the results show the equilibrium order quantity and the profit of LSI and LSSC increase while the equilibrium price and profit of FLSP decrease, if survival probability P00 of two FLSPs increase.
  • Keywords
    game theory; logistics; optimisation; outsourcing; service industries; supply chain management; LSI; LSSC; capacity distribution model; functional logistics service providers; game model; logistics service integrators; logistics service supply chain; order quantity; outsourcing; profit optimization; Correlation; Games; Large scale integration; Optimization; Resource management; Supply chains; Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC); default correlation; game theory; risk effect; supply chain management;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management of e-Commerce and e-Government (ICMeCG), 2010 Fourth International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Chengdu
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8507-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMeCG.2010.77
  • Filename
    5628704