The impact of different rankings of large shareholders to corporate performance

The paper investigates whether and how the power´s balance can affect the performance of Japanese listed companies. With sample data of companies listed on Tokyo Stock Exchange, it was interpreted that Tobin´s q (Q) and ROA (Return on Assets) could be regressed on Z (the radio of large shareholders) and L, I, F (the dummy variables of different large shareholders). By the empirical result, the dummy variable of institutional investors in any ranking is always positive related to ROA. The dummy variable of legal investors is negatively related to Q and ROA at 1% significant level only when they are the largest shareholders. In the other rankings, legal shareholders have no significant impacts on Q and ROA. As the largest shareholders, the foreign investors´ dummy variable is positively related to Q and ROA. When the foreign investors are the second largest shareholders, their dummy variable has not impacts on Q and ROA.