• DocumentCode
    2964300
  • Title

    Agency Costs of Engineering Project Procurement

  • Author

    Shouke Chen ; Zhuobin Wei

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Logistics Eng., Naval Univ. of Eng., Tianjin, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    12-14 Aug. 2011
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    5
  • Abstract
    Based on asymmetric information game and principal-agent theory, by analyzing the forming reasons and connotation relationships of agency costs which occurs during the process of engineering project procurement, this paper give out the model of optimal contract and monitoring mechanism. It also analyzes the relationships between the monitoring mechanism and incentive mechanism.
  • Keywords
    contracts; game theory; procurement; project management; agency costs; asymmetric information game; engineering project procurement process; incentive mechanism; monitoring mechanism; optimal contract model; principal-agent theory; Contracts; Games; Hydroelectric power generation; Investments; Loss measurement; Monitoring; Procurement;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-6579-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5998229
  • Filename
    5998229
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=2964300