DocumentCode :
2984976
Title :
Specific Human Capital and Optimal Design of Pension Plans
Author :
Lu Feng ; Yang, Yansui ; Shi Bingqing
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Public Policy & Manage., Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China
fYear :
2011
fDate :
12-14 Aug. 2011
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
4
Abstract :
The optimal design of a corporate pension plan should be able to balance employee incentives and the profits of the enterprise. Given the existence of specific human capital, an employee has a certain "bargaining power" in the enterprise, and this bargaining power must be taken into account in the pension plan design. We set the model based on such considerations, and we first studied the attractiveness of a specific pension plan with respect to the type and the degrees of effort of employees. The following comparative static analysis showed how the changes in a pension plan\´s factors influenced the employees\´ participation and degree of effort. Finally, we studied the optimal design of a pension plan, which maximizes the profits of the enterprise under different combinations of factors.
Keywords :
incentive schemes; pensions; profitability; statistical analysis; strategic planning; bargaining power; comparative static analysis; corporate pension plan; employee incentives; employee participation; enterprise profits; optimal design; specific human capital; Economics; Humans; Investments; Mathematical model; Pensions; Presses;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6579-8
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2011.5999306
Filename :
5999306
Link To Document :
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