Analysis of the Authentication Protocols Based on Game Theory

Using the ideas of game theory, L. H. Nguyen transformed two families of authentication protocols where the honest party transmitted some useless data with probability α before the normal protocol run, so that even if an attacker attacks a protocol, the attacker´s payoff will still be lower than when it does not. In such a way, the security of the protocol is guaranteed. However, this scheme suffers from two shortcomings: (1) the attacker considered is too powerful, only its payoff is considered and the cost of the attacks is ignored, (2) it did not consider in which situation the honest node would choose to send useless data. To improve this scheme, we give the value of with the consideration of the attack cost which value is more general. What´s more, the attack probability β is introduced. Based on which, the precondition that the honest node transmits the useless data is presented, as well as the value of under the different β value. Compared to the original scheme, our results are more generic and comprehensive.