DocumentCode
2998194
Title
The Necessity for Strong Reciprocators in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Author
Seredynski, Marcin ; Danoy, Grégoire ; Bouvry, Pascal
Author_Institution
Interdiscipl. Centre for Security, Reliability & Trust, Univ. of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
fYear
2012
fDate
21-25 May 2012
Firstpage
609
Lastpage
616
Abstract
In civilian mobile ad hoc networks behaviour of network participants in accordance with the collective interest cannot be guaranteed. The cooperation in packet forwarding can emerge if the reciprocal tit-for-tat (TFT) principle is commonly used. This induces the nodes with self-regarding preferences to act cooperatively. However, as demonstrated in this paper, in certain conditions costs of using a reciprocal forwarding are greater than benefits. In such a case, the cooperation can emerge only if nodes with specific behaviour called strong reciprocity are present in the network. This paper analyses such conditions using a nature-inspired evolutionary approach. The computational experiments demonstrate that as soon as at least approximately 70% of nodes follow the TFT-principle in packet forwarding, benefits of its use exceed costs, regardless the forwarding behaviour of the remaining nodes. Consequently, strong reciprocators are not required for sustaining cooperative network. Below that threshold, the need for strong reciprocators depends on the composition of the remaining nodes. In particular, it is positively correlated with the number of unconditionally cooperative nodes as these nodes create incentives for free-riding behaviour.
Keywords
cognitive radio; cooperative communication; game theory; mobile ad hoc networks; TFT principle; cognitive networks; cooperative network; cooperative nodes; evolutionary game theory; free-riding behaviour; mobile ad hoc networks; nature-inspired evolutionary approach; packet forwarding; reciprocal tit-for-tat principle; strong reciprocators; Knowledge based systems; Mobile ad hoc networks; Mobile computing; Relays; Thin film transistors; MANETs; cognitive networks; cooperation; evolutionary game theory; strong reciprocity; tit-for-tat; trust management;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops & PhD Forum (IPDPSW), 2012 IEEE 26th International
Conference_Location
Shanghai
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-0974-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IPDPSW.2012.76
Filename
6270697
Link To Document