DocumentCode :
3002994
Title :
GPS spoofing attack on time synchronization in wireless networks and detection scheme design
Author :
Qi Zeng ; Husheng Li ; Lijun Qian
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA
fYear :
2012
fDate :
Oct. 29 2012-Nov. 1 2012
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
In this paper, we introduce a GPS spoofing attack on the time synchronization in wireless networks. As a case study, the frequency hopping code division multiple access (FH-CDMA) based ad hoc network relying on the GPS signal is investigated. The GPS spoofing attack, which is more malicious than other attacks such as jamming, could lead to the loss of network-wide synchronization as well as the loss of synchronization in FH code. The performance degradation in terms of symbol error rate (SER) of the FH-CDMA based ad hoc network under such an attack is evaluated. Then, to detect the spoofing attack efficiently, we propose to employ a quick detection technique, i.e., CUSUM test algorithm, by observing the dynamic range of the successful detection rate. Simulation results show that GPS spoofing attack on network performance is a long-term impact and more pernicious threat compared to the jamming; moreover, our proposed CUSUM scheme is an effective method to detect the GPS spoofing attack.
Keywords :
Global Positioning System; code division multiple access; jamming; radio networks; synchronisation; CUSUM test algorithm; FH code; FH-CDMA; GPS signal; GPS spoofing attack; SER; detection scheme design; hopping code division multiple access; jamming; symbol error rate; time synchronization; wireless networks; Ad hoc networks; Degradation; Frequency shift keying; Global Positioning System; Jamming; Receivers; Synchronization;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE, 2012 - MILCOM 2012
Conference_Location :
Orlando, FL
ISSN :
2155-7578
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-1729-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/MILCOM.2012.6415619
Filename :
6415619
Link To Document :
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