DocumentCode :
3013626
Title :
Vertical Integration versus First-Mover Advantage — Which is worse?
Author :
Nikogosian, Vigen ; Veith, Tobias
Author_Institution :
Centre for Eur. Economic Res. (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany
fYear :
2009
fDate :
27-29 May 2009
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
6
Abstract :
Vertical integration is said to provide an advantage over non-integrated firms. Therefore, regulatory agencies are strongly interested in separating former fully integrated monopolies in energy markets. In this paper we analyse whether - besides vertical integration - incumbents experience a first-mover advantage in the sense that customers have to switch from an incumbent´s standard contract. Customers who have not yet switched (nearly 60 percent in Germany) still stay in the standard contract and do so at a significantly higher price than the lowest price in the market. When assuming that customers switch only to lower price contracts, new providers are able to enter a market profitably only if their prices are below the standard contract prices. Therefore, incumbents might have a first-mover advantage as they are in the position to define the playing field of competition in their home market.
Keywords :
power markets; energy markets; first-mover advantage; home market; non-integrated firms; standard contract; standard contract prices; vertical integration; Contracts; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Helium; Instruments; Monopoly; Pricing; Regulators; Switches; Yarn; foreclosure; pricediscrimination; vertical integration;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Energy Market, 2009. EEM 2009. 6th International Conference on the European
Conference_Location :
Leuven
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4455-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/EEM.2009.5207142
Filename :
5207142
Link To Document :
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