• DocumentCode
    3013626
  • Title

    Vertical Integration versus First-Mover Advantage — Which is worse?

  • Author

    Nikogosian, Vigen ; Veith, Tobias

  • Author_Institution
    Centre for Eur. Economic Res. (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    27-29 May 2009
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    Vertical integration is said to provide an advantage over non-integrated firms. Therefore, regulatory agencies are strongly interested in separating former fully integrated monopolies in energy markets. In this paper we analyse whether - besides vertical integration - incumbents experience a first-mover advantage in the sense that customers have to switch from an incumbent´s standard contract. Customers who have not yet switched (nearly 60 percent in Germany) still stay in the standard contract and do so at a significantly higher price than the lowest price in the market. When assuming that customers switch only to lower price contracts, new providers are able to enter a market profitably only if their prices are below the standard contract prices. Therefore, incumbents might have a first-mover advantage as they are in the position to define the playing field of competition in their home market.
  • Keywords
    power markets; energy markets; first-mover advantage; home market; non-integrated firms; standard contract; standard contract prices; vertical integration; Contracts; Costs; Electricity supply industry; Helium; Instruments; Monopoly; Pricing; Regulators; Switches; Yarn; foreclosure; pricediscrimination; vertical integration;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Energy Market, 2009. EEM 2009. 6th International Conference on the European
  • Conference_Location
    Leuven
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4455-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/EEM.2009.5207142
  • Filename
    5207142