DocumentCode :
3035065
Title :
Implementing STV securely in Pret a Voter
Author :
Heather, James
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Surrey, Guildford
fYear :
2007
fDate :
6-8 July 2007
Firstpage :
157
Lastpage :
169
Abstract :
Work on electronic voting systems to date has largely focused around first-past-the-post voting. However, the governments of many countries, and many non-governmental organisations, use a single transferable vote system, in which the voter needs to indicate not just a single preferred candidate but a preference ranking of (some or all of) the candidates on offer. This paper investigates the possibility of modifying Pret a Voter to cope with a single transferable vote system. With its newer form involving re-encryption mixes by P.Y.A. Ryan and S.A. Schneider (2006), this seems at first sight to be impossible; with the older version based on RSA onions by D. Chaum et al (2005), the obvious approach works, but security is less than ideal; using multiple re-encryption mix onions for each vote, combined with a lazy decryption semantics, however, proves to be an elegant and efficient solution to the problem.
Keywords :
cryptography; government data processing; Pret a voter; electronic voting system; lazy decryption semantics; multiple reencryption mixes; single transferable vote system; Australia; Cryptography; Electronic voting; Electronic voting systems; Encoding; Government; Layout; Nominations and elections; Security;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2007. CSF '07. 20th IEEE
Conference_Location :
Venice
ISSN :
1940-1434
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-2819-8
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CSF.2007.22
Filename :
4271647
Link To Document :
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