• DocumentCode
    3035065
  • Title

    Implementing STV securely in Pret a Voter

  • Author

    Heather, James

  • Author_Institution
    Univ. of Surrey, Guildford
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    6-8 July 2007
  • Firstpage
    157
  • Lastpage
    169
  • Abstract
    Work on electronic voting systems to date has largely focused around first-past-the-post voting. However, the governments of many countries, and many non-governmental organisations, use a single transferable vote system, in which the voter needs to indicate not just a single preferred candidate but a preference ranking of (some or all of) the candidates on offer. This paper investigates the possibility of modifying Pret a Voter to cope with a single transferable vote system. With its newer form involving re-encryption mixes by P.Y.A. Ryan and S.A. Schneider (2006), this seems at first sight to be impossible; with the older version based on RSA onions by D. Chaum et al (2005), the obvious approach works, but security is less than ideal; using multiple re-encryption mix onions for each vote, combined with a lazy decryption semantics, however, proves to be an elegant and efficient solution to the problem.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; government data processing; Pret a voter; electronic voting system; lazy decryption semantics; multiple reencryption mixes; single transferable vote system; Australia; Cryptography; Electronic voting; Electronic voting systems; Encoding; Government; Layout; Nominations and elections; Security;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Security Foundations Symposium, 2007. CSF '07. 20th IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Venice
  • ISSN
    1940-1434
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-2819-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSF.2007.22
  • Filename
    4271647