Title :
Incentive problems: A class of stochastic stackelberg closed-loop dynamic games
Author :
Chang, Tsu-shuan ; Ho, Yu-chi
Author_Institution :
SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY
Abstract :
Three different versions of a stochastic Stackelberg closed-loop dynamic game are presented These three versions correspond to complete state information structure, one-step-delay sharing information structure and control-sharing information structure. The essential difficulty of solving the problem comes from the fact that the information structure is non-nested from the leader´s viewpoint. We discuss how to solve these problems.
Keywords :
Broadcasting; Cost function; Decision theory; Monitoring; Optimal control; Optimized production technology; Stochastic processes;
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control including the Symposium on Adaptive Processes, 1981 20th IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Diego, CA, USA
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.1981.269395