DocumentCode :
3046541
Title :
On the formal verification of delegation in SESAME
Author :
Ayadi, Marc Mehdi ; Bolignano, Dominique
Author_Institution :
Cap Germini/Div. Finance, Paris, France
fYear :
1997
fDate :
16-19 Jun 1997
Firstpage :
23
Lastpage :
34
Abstract :
The objective of this paper is to present the verification of delegation in the SESAME protocol, a compatible extension version of Kerberos. For this we use the formal approach presented in Bolignano (1997). This approach is based on the use of state-based general purpose formal methods. It makes a clear separation between modeling of reliable agents and that of intruders. The SESAME protocol allows a principal in the system to delegate his rights to another principal or a group of principals. The formalization is transposed in a quite systematic manner into the Coq prover´s formalism, and the complete formal proof is performed. The proof relies on the fact that confidentiality of keys shared by the multiple authorities involved in the protocol is guaranteed
Keywords :
access protocols; formal verification; security of data; SESAME; SESAME protocol; confidentiality of keys; delegation; formal approach; formal proof; formal verification; intruders; reliable agents; state-based; Access protocols; Authentication; Body sensor networks; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Finance; Formal verification; Joining processes; Logic; Protection;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computer Assurance, 1997. COMPASS '97. Are We Making Progress Towards Computer Assurance? Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference on
Conference_Location :
Gaithersburg, MD
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-3979-7
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CMPASS.1997.613201
Filename :
613201
Link To Document :
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