DocumentCode :
305398
Title :
Strategic learning in games with incomplete information
Author :
Wang, Muhong
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Finance & Manage. Sci., St. Mary´´s Univ., Halifax, NS, Canada
Volume :
3
fYear :
1996
fDate :
14-17 Oct 1996
Firstpage :
2047
Abstract :
In this paper, strategic interactions between two decision makers in a signaling game are studied, where incomplete information and misperception are involved. In this game player A has private information, and sends a signal to player B at the start of the game. B would then take an action based on the message he receives and the interpretation he makes to such a message. Because of the conflict interests, both decision makers have to think about all possible perception and misperception. As one varies those hypotheses, one varies the optimal responses of B, and hence, the incentives of A to send various messages. The noncooperative equilibria, obtained by using various solution concept, are interpreted as a learning process, where the decision makers may revise their perceptions about the opponent. The hypergame transitory and persistent stability is used to examine the perceived equilibriums, which explains an “out-of-equilibrium” action taken by a player in a course of a game, and why a rational decision maker may appear to be irrational
Keywords :
decision theory; game theory; learning (artificial intelligence); decision makers; incomplete information; learning process; misperception; noncooperative equilibria; private information; signaling game; stability; strategic interactions; Environmental economics; Environmental management; Finance; Financial management; Game theory; Information analysis; Signal analysis; Stability analysis;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1996., IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
ISSN :
1062-922X
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-3280-6
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICSMC.1996.565449
Filename :
565449
Link To Document :
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