Title :
A bilateral bargaining model with randomly chosen offer rights
Author :
Yue, Pan ; Yingping, Zheng
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Autom., Acad. Sinica, Beijing, China
Abstract :
We present a model to analyze the influence of the offer right in bilateral bargainings, which is characterized by two variables, that is, the frequency to make offers and the right to make first offer. The solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is adopted. We also give the strategy for mediator to regulate the bargain position of players by means of choosing offer right
Keywords :
economic cybernetics; game theory; bargaining position regulation; bilateral bargaining model; mediator; randomly chosen offer rights; subgame perfect equilibrium; Automation; Costs; Decision making; Engineering management; Frequency; Game theory; Power engineering and energy; Power generation economics;
Conference_Titel :
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 1996., IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-3280-6
DOI :
10.1109/ICSMC.1996.569761
