Title :
A Formal IT-Security Model for a Weak Fair-Exchange Cooperation with Non-repudiation Proofs
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Inf. Syst. Res., Univ. Koblenz-Landau, Koblenz, Germany
Abstract :
This article presents a formal IT-security model for the step-by-step exchange of digital items. Following the taxonomy of Asokan the model presented here addresses the security requirements for a so-called ldquoweakrdquo fair exchange. ldquoWeakrdquo refers to the fact, that third parties are used to dissolve disputes. In this model, non-repudiation proofs are used in an external dispute to establish weak fairness. It shows how many unproved steps can be tolerated by one party without loss of fairness. The model is based on the idea of a ldquocontinuous balance of obligations and their proofsrdquo. This idea was proposed 1993 by Grimm, but never since formalized properly.
Keywords :
cryptographic protocols; public key cryptography; set theory; digital item; fair exchange protocol; formal IT security model; freedom-of-obligation property; nonrepudiation proof; public-key certification; set theory; step-by-step exchange; weak fair-exchange cooperation; Computer security; Electronic mail; Information security; Information systems; Internet; Law; Legal factors; Protocols; Sections; Taxonomy; IT-security model; fair exchange; non-repudiation; obligation; secure state; transition rule; trust model;
Conference_Titel :
Emerging Security Information, Systems and Technologies, 2009. SECURWARE '09. Third International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Athens, Glyfada
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3668-2
DOI :
10.1109/SECURWARE.2009.15