Title :
Radio Resource Management for Green Wireless Networks
Author :
Comaniciu, Cristina ; Mandayam, Narayan B. ; Poor, Vincent H.
Author_Institution :
ECE Dept., Stevens Inst. of Technol., Hoboken, NJ, USA
Abstract :
In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with the two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes´ dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding.
Keywords :
cellular radio; game theory; incentive schemes; pricing; Vickrey auction; cellular networks; cooperative relaying; game theory; green wireless networks; incentivizes cooperation; interference management; radio resource management; Atmospheric measurements; Base stations; Energy consumption; Extraterrestrial measurements; Global warming; Mobile communication; Pricing; Relays; Resource management; Wireless networks;
Conference_Titel :
Vehicular Technology Conference Fall (VTC 2009-Fall), 2009 IEEE 70th
Conference_Location :
Anchorage, AK
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-2514-3
Electronic_ISBN :
1090-3038
DOI :
10.1109/VETECF.2009.5379028