Title :
Pricing for Rate Allocation in Unicast Service Provisioning is Informationally Efficient
Author :
Stoenescu, Tudor Mihai ; Teneketzis, Demosthenis
Author_Institution :
Postdoctoral Scholar in the Social and Information Science Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 1200 E. California Boulevard, Pasadena Ca 91101 tudor@caltech.edu
Abstract :
We establish the informational efficiency of the pricing mechanism for unicast service provisioning, a class of decentralized resource allocation problems that arise in communication networks. We also present instances of network resource allocation problems where users are price takers and pricing mechanisms are not informationally efficient.
Keywords :
Communication networks; Information science; Intelligent networks; Intserv networks; Laboratories; Pricing; Resource management; Routing; Space technology; Unicast;
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control, 2005 and 2005 European Control Conference. CDC-ECC '05. 44th IEEE Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9567-0
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.2005.1582309
