Title :
Incentive compatible mechanism design for synthetic task allocation in virtual organizations
Author :
He, Linli ; Ioerger, Thomas R.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Texas A & M Univ., College Station, TX, USA
fDate :
April 18-21, 2005
Keywords :
cooperative systems; incentive schemes; task analysis; virtual enterprises; agent cooperation; algorithmic mechanism design optimization problem; computational organizational models; incentive compatible mechanism design; organizational agents; synthetic task allocation; virtual organizations; Computational modeling; Computer science; Design optimization; Engineering management; Finishing; Helium; Internet; Productivity; Project management; Resource management;
Conference_Titel :
Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 2005. International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9013-X
DOI :
10.1109/KIMAS.2005.1427081
