Title :
Design of ancillary service markets
Author_Institution :
California Univ., Berkeley, CA, USA
Abstract :
Examines the design of bid selection protocols and settlement rules in ancillary service markets. Such markets are typically operated by an independent system operator (ISO) for competitive procurement of reserves that are needed to ensure the secure operation of a competitive electric power system. Reserve types are characterized in terms of response time, and they are downward-substitutable (faster responding reserves can replace slower ones). We explore how this substitutability is accounted for in alternative market protocols and we analyze the efficiency, distributional aspects and incentive compatibility of such protocols.
Keywords :
contracts; economic cybernetics; electricity supply industry; power system economics; ancillary service markets; bid selection protocols; competitive electric power system; competitive procurement; distributional aspects; downward-substitutable reserves; efficiency; incentive compatibility; independent system operator; market protocols; response time; secure operation; settlement rules; Control systems; Delay; Electricity supply industry; ISO standards; Load management; Procurement; Protocols; Real time systems; Spinning; Voltage;
Conference_Titel :
System Sciences, 2001. Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Maui, HI, USA
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-0981-9
DOI :
10.1109/HICSS.2001.926283
