Title :
Multipolar deterrence in a dynamic environment
Author :
Rudnianski, Michel
Author_Institution :
ARESAD, Paris, France
Abstract :
The theory of matrix games of deterrence, initially developed to account for deterrence in a bipolar framework, is extended to the case of N players and multi-stage dynamics. The results are then applied to industrial competition, and nuclear deterrence
Keywords :
commerce; game theory; politics; dynamic environment; industrial competition; integral outcomes; matrix games; multipolar deterrence; nonsequential games; nuclear deterrence; terminal outcomes; Bipartite graph; Circuits; Equations; Extremities; Game theory; Industrial relations; Joining processes;
Conference_Titel :
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 1995. Intelligent Systems for the 21st Century., IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Vancouver, BC
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-2559-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICSMC.1995.538464
