• DocumentCode
    3176203
  • Title

    Analysis on supervision mechanism of government in PPP contract

  • Author

    Song, Bo ; Xu, Fei ; Zhou, Ying

  • Author_Institution
    Shanghai Inst. of Tourism, Shanghai Normal Univ., Shanghai, China
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    8-10 Aug. 2011
  • Firstpage
    6549
  • Lastpage
    6552
  • Abstract
    From the dynamic perspective, a two-staged incentive model between public and private sectors is designed based on the Holmstrom-Tirole incentive model under principal-agent theory framework, aiming at building the relational contract between public and private sectors. In the model, the expected benefit of relational contract and the dynamic interactions between two stages are considered. Besides, the optimal effort level of private sectors and reward-punishment factors of public sectors in each stage are analyzed by applying backward induction, especially the dynamic interactions between two stages. Lastly, the contingent incentive mechanism will be advanced by integrating the external supervision and intrinsic incentive in PPP contract.
  • Keywords
    contracts; government; incentive schemes; Holmstrom-Tirole incentive model; PPP contract; backward induction; dynamic perspective; government; principal-agent theory framework; private sector; public sector; relational contract; reward-punishment factors; supervision mechanism; two-staged incentive model; Analytical models; Collaboration; Contracts; Economics; Government; Investments; Optimization; contract; public-private partnership; supervision mechanism;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Deng Leng
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4577-0535-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6010714
  • Filename
    6010714