DocumentCode
3180689
Title
Asymmetric information and executive compensation contract management
Author
Zhang, Shengli
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Polytech. Univ., Jiaozuo, China
fYear
2011
fDate
8-10 Aug. 2011
Firstpage
1959
Lastpage
1962
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the function of executive compensation, as well as the effect of asymmetric information on the effectiveness of compensation contract, using the theory of information asymmetry in information economics. We also put forward measures to improve the effectiveness of compensation contract.
Keywords
contracts; economics; management information systems; asymmetric information management; executive compensation contract management; information economics; Analytical models; Companies; Contracts; Humans; Sensitivity; Stock markets; compensation contract; compensation-performance sensitivity; information asymmetry;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location
Deng Leng
Print_ISBN
978-1-4577-0535-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6010951
Filename
6010951
Link To Document