Title :
Asymmetric information and executive compensation contract management
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Polytech. Univ., Jiaozuo, China
Abstract :
In this paper, we analyze the function of executive compensation, as well as the effect of asymmetric information on the effectiveness of compensation contract, using the theory of information asymmetry in information economics. We also put forward measures to improve the effectiveness of compensation contract.
Keywords :
contracts; economics; management information systems; asymmetric information management; executive compensation contract management; information economics; Analytical models; Companies; Contracts; Humans; Sensitivity; Stock markets; compensation contract; compensation-performance sensitivity; information asymmetry;
Conference_Titel :
Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce (AIMSEC), 2011 2nd International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Deng Leng
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4577-0535-9
DOI :
10.1109/AIMSEC.2011.6010951
