Notice of RetractionThe impact of project leader´s “lobbying behavior” on scientific research project decisions

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

Project leader´s lobbying behavior is a common phenomenon because research projects are constrained by investment funds in science-and-technology enterprises. But two decision-making methods of project at home and abroad, static analysis and options dynamic analysis, usually ignore lobbying behaviors, which cause deviation between analysis results and facts. This paper introduces project leader´s lobbying for analyzing different results of investment decision under different conditions using information rent theory, and argues that project leader´s lobbying plays a dual role of positive and negative. Based on that, this paper thinks that the negative effect may be restrained by the balance of project leader´s double identity and setting up reasonable information rent, while positive effect can be used through restriction on lobbying interval and investment performance incentives mechanism.