DocumentCode
3205314
Title
A Signal Game Theory Based Reputation Model of Supply Chain of Medicine Retail Enterprises
Author
Shumei, Yue ; Qiujun, Guo ; Weijie, Guo
Author_Institution
Inst. of Chinese Med., Henan Univ., Kaifeng, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
11-12 May 2010
Firstpage
343
Lastpage
346
Abstract
In order to improve the service offered by the medicine retail enterprises, game theory is utilized to analyze the customers’ relationships and the reputation of supply chain enterprises. Equilibrium strategies in the signaling game of catering enterprises and customers are studied theoretically. The reputation model of the supply chain enterprises is built. The reputation of supply chain influenced the judgment of customers and the profit of enterprises directly. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
Keywords
Automatic control; Automation; Costs; Ethics; Game theory; Genetic mutations; Humans; Signal analysis; Supply chains; Uncertainty; Medicine Retail Enterprises; Reputation; Signal Game Theory; Supply Chain;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Changsha, China
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7279-6
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-7280-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICICTA.2010.351
Filename
5523349
Link To Document