• DocumentCode
    3205314
  • Title

    A Signal Game Theory Based Reputation Model of Supply Chain of Medicine Retail Enterprises

  • Author

    Shumei, Yue ; Qiujun, Guo ; Weijie, Guo

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. of Chinese Med., Henan Univ., Kaifeng, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    11-12 May 2010
  • Firstpage
    343
  • Lastpage
    346
  • Abstract
    In order to improve the service offered by the medicine retail enterprises, game theory is utilized to analyze the customers’ relationships and the reputation of supply chain enterprises. Equilibrium strategies in the signaling game of catering enterprises and customers are studied theoretically. The reputation model of the supply chain enterprises is built. The reputation of supply chain influenced the judgment of customers and the profit of enterprises directly. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
  • Keywords
    Automatic control; Automation; Costs; Ethics; Game theory; Genetic mutations; Humans; Signal analysis; Supply chains; Uncertainty; Medicine Retail Enterprises; Reputation; Signal Game Theory; Supply Chain;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Changsha, China
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7279-6
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7280-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICICTA.2010.351
  • Filename
    5523349