Title :
Spot market mechanism design and competitivity issues in electric power
Author :
Denton, Michael J. ; Rassenti, Stephen J. ; Smith, Vernon L.
Author_Institution :
Utilities Int. Inc., USA
Abstract :
Continuing previous research on market power issues in electricity markets, the authors report new experiments which compare the sealed bid offer (SBO) market mechanism, studied by Backerman et al. (1997), with a uniform price double auction mechanism (UPDA) that updates nodal prices and allocations continuously as new bids and offers arrive in real time down to the close when the market is “called” and all standing accepted bids and offers become binding spot contracts. They compare the performance of the SBO and UPDA institutions in terms of their impact on incentives affecting market efficiency (the ability to exhaust the gains from exchange), generator and wholesale buyer profitability, and delivery price. Under each of the two trading institutions they compare markets in which the available generator capacities and their costs are held by three versus six independent companies
Keywords :
contracts; economics; electricity supply industry; allocation updating; binding spot contracts; competitivity; costs; delivery price; electric power; electricity markets; generator capacities; generator profitability; independent companies; market efficiency; market power issues; nodal price updating; sealed bid offer market mechanism; spot market mechanism design; trading institutions; uniform price double auction mechanism; wholesale buyer profitability; Australia; Computer industry; Contracts; Cost function; Electricity supply industry; Government; Performance gain; Power generation; Pressing; Profitability;
Conference_Titel :
System Sciences, 1998., Proceedings of the Thirty-First Hawaii International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Kohala Coast, HI
Print_ISBN :
0-8186-8255-8
DOI :
10.1109/HICSS.1998.656012
