DocumentCode :
3215871
Title :
Zero-knowledge: abstract of a tutorial
Author :
Goldreich, Oded
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Weizmann Inst. of Sci., Rehovot, Israel
fYear :
2002
fDate :
2002
Firstpage :
3
Abstract :
Zero-knowledge proofs are fascinating and extremely useful constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory definition; zero-knowledge proofs are both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proven. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol. In addition to their direct applicability in cryptography, zero-knowledge proofs serve as a good benchmark for the study of various problems regarding cryptographic protocols (e.g., "secure composition of protocols" and the "use of of the adversary\´s program within the proof of security"). We present the basic definitions and results regarding zero-knowledge as well as some recent developments regarding this notion.
Keywords :
cryptography; protocols; theorem proving; assertion; contradictory definition; cryptographic protocols; cryptography; malicious parties; predetermined protocol; proof of security; secure protocol composition; zero-knowledge proofs; Computational modeling; Computer science; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Security; Tutorial; Uniform resource locators;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on
ISSN :
0272-5428
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1822-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SFCS.2002.1181876
Filename :
1181876
Link To Document :
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