• DocumentCode
    3215871
  • Title

    Zero-knowledge: abstract of a tutorial

  • Author

    Goldreich, Oded

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Weizmann Inst. of Sci., Rehovot, Israel
  • fYear
    2002
  • fDate
    2002
  • Firstpage
    3
  • Abstract
    Zero-knowledge proofs are fascinating and extremely useful constructs. Their fascinating nature is due to their seemingly contradictory definition; zero-knowledge proofs are both convincing and yet yield nothing beyond the validity of the assertion being proven. Their applicability in the domain of cryptography is vast; they are typically used to force malicious parties to behave according to a predetermined protocol. In addition to their direct applicability in cryptography, zero-knowledge proofs serve as a good benchmark for the study of various problems regarding cryptographic protocols (e.g., "secure composition of protocols" and the "use of of the adversary\´s program within the proof of security"). We present the basic definitions and results regarding zero-knowledge as well as some recent developments regarding this notion.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; protocols; theorem proving; assertion; contradictory definition; cryptographic protocols; cryptography; malicious parties; predetermined protocol; proof of security; secure protocol composition; zero-knowledge proofs; Computational modeling; Computer science; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Security; Tutorial; Uniform resource locators;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings. The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on
  • ISSN
    0272-5428
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1822-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SFCS.2002.1181876
  • Filename
    1181876