Title :
Protocol scrubbing: network security through transparent flow modification
Author :
Watson, David ; Smart, Matthew ; Malan, G. Robert ; Jahanian, Farnam
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci., Michigan Univ., Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Abstract :
Describes the design and implementation of protocol scrubbers. Protocol scrubbers are transparent, active interposition mechanisms for explicitly removing network scans and attacks at various protocol layers. The transport scrubber supports downstream passive network-based intrusion detection systems by converting ambiguous network flows into well-behaved flows that are unequivocally interpreted by all downstream end-points. The fingerprint scrubber restricts an attacker´s ability to determine the operating system of a protected host. As an example, this paper presents the implementation of a TCP scrubber that eliminates insertion and evasion attacks - attacks that use ambiguities to subvert detection - on passive network-based intrusion detection systems, while preserving high performance. The TCP scrubber is based on a novel, simplified state machine that performs in a fast and scalable manner. The fingerprint scrubber is built upon the TCP scrubber and removes additional ambiguities from flows that can reveal implementation-specific details about a host´s operating system
Keywords :
network operating systems; telecommunication security; transport protocols; TCP scrubber; ambiguities; ambiguous network flows; detection subversion; downstream passive network-based intrusion detection systems; evasion attacks; fingerprint scrubber; host operating system determination; implementation-specific details; insertion attacks; network attacks; network scans; network security; passive network-based intrusion detection systems; performance; protected host; protocol scrubbers; state machine; transparent active interposition mechanisms; transparent flow modification; transport scrubber; Banking; Business; Computer security; Fingerprint recognition; Intrusion detection; Operating systems; Protection; Protocols; TCPIP; Telecommunication traffic;
Conference_Titel :
DARPA Information Survivability Conference & Exposition II, 2001. DISCEX '01. Proceedings
Conference_Location :
Anaheim, CA
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-1212-7
DOI :
10.1109/DISCEX.2001.932163