Title :
A differentiated pricing mechanism for idle resources allocation in reservation clouds
Author :
Jiang Fu ; Pingping Yao ; Kaiyang Liu ; Jun Peng
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Inf. Sci. & Eng., Central South Univ., Beijing, China
Abstract :
In cloud computing, Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud providers can offer two types of renting plans for Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) clouds, including on-demand plan and reservation plan. The SaaS cloud provider prefers reservation plan for its cheaper price. However, it may cause highly unused capacity without the knowledge of future demands. Therefore, how to improve the utilization of the idle reserved resources is a critical issue. To address this issue, a novel leasing mechanism based on the non-cooperative game is investigated to reallocate the redundant resources. Then to further increase the profit SaaS clouds, a differentiated pricing scheme is proposed. Numerical simulation results indicate that the proposed scheme can improve the profit of SaaS cloud provider and reduce the cost of end users.
Keywords :
cloud computing; cost reduction; game theory; pricing; resource allocation; IaaS cloud provider; SaaS cloud provider; cloud computing; cost reduction; differentiated pricing mechanism; idle resources allocation; infrastructure-as-a-service; leasing mechanism; noncooperative game; numerical simulation; on-demand plan; reservation cloud; reservation plan; resource utilization; software-as-a-service; Cloud computing; Computational modeling; Games; Optimization; Pricing; Resource management; Software as a service; Cloud computing; Differentiated pricing; Non-cooperative game; Reservation;
Conference_Titel :
Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2015 27th Chinese
Conference_Location :
Qingdao
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-7016-2
DOI :
10.1109/CCDC.2015.7162648
