DocumentCode :
3227274
Title :
Study of Externality Controlling Model in Principal-Agent
Author :
Wang Li-na ; Cheng Chun-mei ; Li Tong-yu
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. Manage., Liaoning Univ. of Technol., Jinzhou
Volume :
2
fYear :
2008
fDate :
20-22 Oct. 2008
Firstpage :
822
Lastpage :
825
Abstract :
To establish model of externality controlling, described value functions under outsourcing model of administrator giving pollution controlling business to pollution releasing enterprise in externality controlling, and analyzed externality decisions under different information conditions. Under asymmetric information condition, administrator as principal, the enterprise as agent, established outsourcing´s pollution controlling quality evaluation principal agent model. Consider the situation of the enterprise´s pollution controlling level was hided, used maximum value axiom derived optimal solutions of administrator´s quality evaluation and transfer payment, contrasted results under different information environment. Then, simulation calculation tested and verified analysis result.
Keywords :
decision theory; environmental economics; outsourcing; pollution control; asymmetric information condition; decision theory; externality controlling model; maximum value axiom; outsourcing model; pollution controlling business; pollution releasing enterprise; principal-agent model; quality evaluation; transfer payment; Analytical models; Automatic control; Automation; Conference management; Environmental economics; Information analysis; Optimal control; Outsourcing; Pollution; Technology management; Externality Controlling Model; Pollution; Principal-Agent;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation (ICICTA), 2008 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Hunan
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3357-5
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICICTA.2008.96
Filename :
4659876
Link To Document :
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