The Hierarchical Threat Model of Routing Security for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

The hierarchical threat model is proposed to address the issues that the active-n-m attacker model can´t reflect the real capability of the attacker and the Dolev-Yao threat model is not fit for the security analysis of ad hoc routing. In hierarchical treat model, we appropriately extend the communication capability of the active-n-m attacker, and abandon the assumption that the adversary controls all of the communication paths in Dolev-Yao threat model. In addition, the number of nodes controlled by the adversary and the knowledge owned by the adversary are considered as the two important parameters to evaluate the attack strength. Lastly, we analyze the security of endairA and ARAN. Both of them are provably secure routing for ad hoc networks in active-n-m attacker model. But it has been proven that both of them have security flaws in the hierarchical threat model. The minimum attacker capability corrupted endairA and ARAN is identified in hierarchical threat model.