Title :
Auction-based dynamic spectrum trading market — Spectrum allocation and profit sharing
Author :
Chun, Sung Hyun ; La, Richard J.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
fDate :
Sept. 30 2009-Oct. 2 2009
Abstract :
We study the problem of designing a new trading market for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we assume that the sellers employ an optimal mechanism, called the generalized Branco´s mechanism, and prove that there exists an incentive for risk neutral sellers of the spectrum to cooperate in order to maximize their expected profits at the SMSNEs of buyers´ noncooperative game. Third, we model the interaction among the sellers as a cooperative game and demonstrate that the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. This indicates that there exists a way for the sellers to share the profits in a such manner that no subset of sellers will deviate from cooperating with the remaining sellers. Finally, we propose a profit sharing scheme that can achieve any payoff vector in the nonempty core of the cooperative game while satisfying two desirable properties.
Keywords :
commerce; marketing; spread spectrum communication; auction-based dynamic spectrum trading market; generalized Branco mechanism; noncooperative game; profit sharing; spectrum allocation; symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; Channel allocation; Chromium; Design engineering; Educational institutions; FCC; Frequency; Incentive schemes; Nash equilibrium; Switches; US Government;
Conference_Titel :
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2009. Allerton 2009. 47th Annual Allerton Conference on
Conference_Location :
Monticello, IL
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5870-7
DOI :
10.1109/ALLERTON.2009.5394770