Defeating classical Hardware Countermeasures: a new processing for Side Channel Analysis

In the field of the side channel analysis, hardware distortions such as glitches and random frequency are classical countermeasures. A glitch influences the side channel amplitude while a random frequency damages the signal both in time and in amplitude. For minimizing these countermeasures effects, some trace treatments based on peak extraction or auto-correlation methods exist. However, none of them takes into account the amplitude mistake. In this paper, we show that this amplitude mistake is created by glitches but also by a random frequency. We propose then a reshaping processing that erases these effects on side channel traces both on the time and amplitude axis. The solution reconstructed a side channel signal, avoiding the hardware countermeasures and the clock relativity consequences which can be meaningful for Side Channel Attacks. Its efficiency is demonstrated on a Differential Power Attack performed on a DES implementation and on a Template Attack performed on a RSA implementation.