DocumentCode :
32502
Title :
Reconciling the Overlay and Underlay Tussle
Author :
Jin Xiao ; Boutaba, R.
Author_Institution :
IBM T. J. Watson Res. Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
Volume :
22
Issue :
5
fYear :
2014
fDate :
Oct. 2014
Firstpage :
1489
Lastpage :
1502
Abstract :
In the presence of multiple overlays and underlays, the emerging global network behavior is the result of interactions of self-serving overlay routing decisions and independent underlay management actions. It is crucial for network operators, service, and content providers to have a good grasp of the underlying principles in order to better design and manage current and future networks and services. In this paper, we describe special game scenarios wherein the interaction of noncooperative overlays and underlays in multidomain networks can result in an operable global configuration in linear time and the overall convergence is polynomial in the unweighed case. For weighted games, we find that weighted Shapley potential can achieve linear time convergence to an operable state. Furthermore, we analyze the interaction of overlays and underlays as a two-stage congestion game and recommend simple operational guidelines to ensure global stability. We further explore the use of Shapley value as an enabler of mutual cooperation in an otherwise competitive environment. Our simulation results confirm our findings and demonstrate its effectiveness in general networks.
Keywords :
computer network management; game theory; overlay networks; Shapley value; content providers; emerging global network behavior; game scenario; general networks; global configuration; global stability; independent underlay management action; linear time convergence; multidomain networks; mutual cooperation; network operators; noncooperative overlay-underlay interaction; operational guideline; overlay tussle; polynomial convergence; self-serving overlay routing decision; two-stage congestion game; underlay tussle; weighted Shapley potential; weighted games; Convergence; Cost function; Games; Nash equilibrium; Polynomials; Routing; Stability analysis; Congestion game; Shapley value; network stability;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1063-6692
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/TNET.2013.2281276
Filename :
6616019
Link To Document :
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