• DocumentCode
    32502
  • Title

    Reconciling the Overlay and Underlay Tussle

  • Author

    Jin Xiao ; Boutaba, R.

  • Author_Institution
    IBM T. J. Watson Res. Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
  • Volume
    22
  • Issue
    5
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    Oct. 2014
  • Firstpage
    1489
  • Lastpage
    1502
  • Abstract
    In the presence of multiple overlays and underlays, the emerging global network behavior is the result of interactions of self-serving overlay routing decisions and independent underlay management actions. It is crucial for network operators, service, and content providers to have a good grasp of the underlying principles in order to better design and manage current and future networks and services. In this paper, we describe special game scenarios wherein the interaction of noncooperative overlays and underlays in multidomain networks can result in an operable global configuration in linear time and the overall convergence is polynomial in the unweighed case. For weighted games, we find that weighted Shapley potential can achieve linear time convergence to an operable state. Furthermore, we analyze the interaction of overlays and underlays as a two-stage congestion game and recommend simple operational guidelines to ensure global stability. We further explore the use of Shapley value as an enabler of mutual cooperation in an otherwise competitive environment. Our simulation results confirm our findings and demonstrate its effectiveness in general networks.
  • Keywords
    computer network management; game theory; overlay networks; Shapley value; content providers; emerging global network behavior; game scenario; general networks; global configuration; global stability; independent underlay management action; linear time convergence; multidomain networks; mutual cooperation; network operators; noncooperative overlay-underlay interaction; operational guideline; overlay tussle; polynomial convergence; self-serving overlay routing decision; two-stage congestion game; underlay tussle; weighted Shapley potential; weighted games; Convergence; Cost function; Games; Nash equilibrium; Polynomials; Routing; Stability analysis; Congestion game; Shapley value; network stability;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1063-6692
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TNET.2013.2281276
  • Filename
    6616019