Notice of RetractionDebt contract, accounting information and the creditors´ supervision

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

This paper analyzes the rational supervision behavior of the creditors by establishing the model and the supervision efficiency of the bondholders group based on the public choice theory, then comes to the conclusion that the interest of the bondholders´ collective action can not achieve Pareto Optimality in current China corporate bond market, due to the small size of institutional investors while the large size of the public investors dispersing all over the country. Therefore, the paper points out the two ways to achieve Pareto improvement: one is to foster the institutional investors, another is to choose a collective agent, functioning as the supervisor to resolve the “dilemma” of the collective action. At last, the paper proposes that the key factor to protect the interest of the creditors is to establish and improve the related laws as soon as possible, for the currently enforced the bond custody system lacks many basic operational systems.