DocumentCode
3266541
Title
Noncooperative constrained finite games: alternate linear programming approach
Author
Godoy, M. ; Gomez Ramrez, E. ; Poznyak, A. ; Najim, K.
Author_Institution
Dept. de Control Autom., CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico City, Mexico
Volume
4
fYear
2002
fDate
10-13 Dec. 2002
Firstpage
3958
Abstract
In this paper a new numerical procedure is suggested for the calculation of a Nash-equilibrium point for a static N-persons noncooperative finite game without constraints that involves a solution of a linear programming problem given in the extended (complementary) counter-coalition vector form. In the constrained case, the alternate application of the same linear programming method (ALPM), when some parts of variables are fixed, generates the sequence of vectors converging to a Nash equilibrium point. Several testing examples show the workability of the suggested approach.
Keywords
convergence of numerical methods; game theory; linear programming; Nash equilibrium point; converging vectors; counter coalition vector form; game theory; linear programming; n-person matrix game; noncooperative constrained finite games; Automatic control; Centralized control; Electronic mail; Game theory; Laboratories; Linear programming; Nash equilibrium; Process control; Sufficient conditions; Vectors;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Decision and Control, 2002, Proceedings of the 41st IEEE Conference on
ISSN
0191-2216
Print_ISBN
0-7803-7516-5
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CDC.2002.1184985
Filename
1184985
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