Title :
Reverse logistics: The game between government and distribution centers on recycling products packaging
Author :
Wen, Lin ; Yunxian, Hou ; Anan, Ma ; Yuguo, Hou
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Humanity & Economic Manage., China Univ. of Geosci., Beijing, China
Abstract :
The paper sets up and analyzes the game model of government and distribution centers on recycling products packaging with game theory. And the equilibrium is solved. The studies indicate as follows. In the situation of definite cost, benefits for recycling products packaging, and premium put by government, the punishment probability by government becomes smaller, and the recycling probability of distribution centers becomes much larger, as penal sum becomes larger. Then distribution centers can choose optimum strategy of "recycle". Meanwhile, in the situation of definite punishment cost, the recycling probability of distribution centers becomes much larger with the larger fine of government. So the effective implementation of government laws and regulations can promote the recycle of products packaging.
Keywords :
distribution strategy; game theory; government policies; packaging; recycling; reverse logistics; distribution centers; game theory; government; punishment probability; recycling products packaging; reverse logistics; Costs; Councils; Environmental economics; Environmental management; Game theory; Government; Packaging; Protection; Recycling; Reverse logistics; distribution centers; game; recycling products packaging; reverse logistics;
Conference_Titel :
Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2010 7th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Tokyo
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6485-2
DOI :
10.1109/ICSSSM.2010.5530264