Title :
Incentive Mechanism Design to the Electronic Products Reverse Supply Chain of Remanufacture Considering the Random Time
Author_Institution :
Coll. of Econ. & Manage., Southeast Univ. Nanjing, Nanjing, China
Abstract :
In order to improve product recovery efficiency and reduce the time required for recovery, thereby incentive mechanisms for electron product kind reuse reverse supply chain are studied based on the principle-agent theory. Secondly, considering the random of recycle response time, a factor of incentive is introduced and a two-stage Stackelberg model is established. Thirdly, on the basis of analysis of optimum, we argue the strategy of optimum decision of manufacturers and collectors and analyze the effect that parameters such as recovery ratio and recycling costs impact on contract decision. Finally, a numerical example is presented to confirm the conclusion.
Keywords :
costing; electronic products; product design; recycling; reverse logistics; supply chain management; Stackelberg model; contract decision; electronic product; incentive mechanism design; optimum decision; principle-agent theory; product recovery; recovery ratio; recovery time reduction; recycle response time; recycling cost; remanufacturing; reverse supply chain; Contracts; Costs; Educational institutions; Environmental economics; Manufacturing industries; Packaging; Pollution measurement; Recycling; Supply chains; Time factors; incentive mechanism; random time; reuse; reverse supply chain;
Conference_Titel :
Circuits, Communications and Systems, 2009. PACCS '09. Pacific-Asia Conference on
Conference_Location :
Chengdu
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3614-9
DOI :
10.1109/PACCS.2009.50