• DocumentCode
    3309252
  • Title

    Iterative incentive scheme for outsourced IA

  • Author

    Schmitz, Edward ; Pinto, C. Ariel ; Arora, Ashish ; Telang, Rahul

  • fYear
    2004
  • fDate
    10-11 June 2004
  • Firstpage
    440
  • Lastpage
    441
  • Abstract
    IT infrastructure can be outsourced to contractors, including the primary responsibility for maintaining network security. Even though an outsourcing contract specifies the minimum level of performance, there is a need to motivate a contractor to further improve such performance. This paper discusses the outsourcing of information assurance (IA) at the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and proposes a model to motivate contractor to perform better using service level agreements (SLAs) and incentives as tools. The model uses an iterative process to overcome the problem of lack of information and serves as basis for data collection & metric development. Coincidentally, this situation exists in other assurance-related outsourcing endeavors such as homeland security.
  • Keywords
    contracts; incentive schemes; intranets; outsourcing; security of data; IT infrastructure; Navy Marine Corps Intranet; homeland security; information assurance outsourcing; iterative incentive scheme; outsourcing contract; service level agreement; Computer networks; Contracts; Cost function; Filtering; Government; Incentive schemes; Information security; Outsourcing; Terrorism; Virtual private networks;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Information Assurance Workshop, 2004. Proceedings from the Fifth Annual IEEE SMC
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7803-8572-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/IAW.2004.1437853
  • Filename
    1437853