• DocumentCode
    3323364
  • Title

    Bargaining games for material procurement in large-scale projects

  • Author

    Fan Dong ; Xiao Tiao-jun ; Dan-qin Yang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage. Sci. & Eng., Nanjing Univ., Nanjing
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    10-12 Sept. 2008
  • Firstpage
    265
  • Lastpage
    270
  • Abstract
    Procurement management is an important process in large-scale projects because large-scale projects heavily depend on building materials from suppliers. This paper applies the basic idea of cooperative game theory and bargaining theory to analyze the cooperation in the procurement of the large-scale projects. We develop two bargaining games of the material procurement between one contractor and one supplier, where they form a procurement coalition. In addition, we give the allocation rule of cooperative surplus for the procurement coalition according to the bargaining theory, i.e., subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions. The allocation plan is acceptable for the two players, very stable, and plays an important role in maintaining the survival of the procurement coalition. But the relative bargaining power of the players will determine who benefits more from cooperation.
  • Keywords
    building materials; construction industry; game theory; procurement; project management; bargaining games; building materials; contractor; cooperative game theory; cooperative surplus; large-scale projects; material procurement; procurement coalition; procurement management; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solutions; Building materials; Collaboration; Conference management; Costs; Delay; Engineering management; Game theory; Large-scale systems; Procurement; Project management; COALITION; bargaining; large-scale project; procurement management;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management Science and Engineering, 2008. ICMSE 2008. 15th Annual Conference Proceedings., International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Long Beach, CA
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2387-3
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-2388-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSE.2008.4668926
  • Filename
    4668926