Title :
Research on incentive and restraint mechanisms of ERP project implementation based on principal-agent theory
Author_Institution :
ERP Lab., Guangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanning, China
Abstract :
Principal-agent relationship exists in the ERP project implementation. For owners, it is difficult to simply use the “Compulsory contract” and the supervision to force the supplier to select the desired action to the owners. Combining project supervision with incentive contract is an optimal mechanism to encourage and restrict the supplier complete the ERP project by the owner´s expectation.
Keywords :
consumer behaviour; contracts; enterprise resource planning; incentive schemes; ERP project implementation; incentive contract; incentive mechanism; principal agent relationship; principal agent theory; project supervision; restraint mechanism; Contracts; Electronics industry; Enterprise resource planning; Finance; Game theory; Laboratories; ERP; incentive and restraint mechanisms; principal-agent theory; project implementation;
Conference_Titel :
Mechanic Automation and Control Engineering (MACE), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-7737-1
DOI :
10.1109/MACE.2010.5536675
