• DocumentCode
    3375862
  • Title

    Verification for OAuth Using ASLan++

  • Author

    Haixing Yan ; Huixing Fang ; Kuka, Christian ; Huibiao Zhu

  • Author_Institution
    Shanghai Key Lab. of Trustworthy Comput., East China Normal Univ., Shanghai, China
  • fYear
    2015
  • fDate
    8-10 Jan. 2015
  • Firstpage
    76
  • Lastpage
    84
  • Abstract
    Over the past few years, OAuth has become an open authorization standard that is being adopted by a growing number of sites such as Twitter, Facebook and Google. It allows users to grant a third-party application access to restricted resources without providing their credentials. However, ensuring the correctness of implementations of OAuth in applications brings multiple concerns. Therefore, it is crucial to verify OAuth with an exhaustive examination by utilizing formal methods. In this paper, we first formalize OAuth with ASLan++ on the AVANTSSAR platform and propose several fundamental security properties on it which are specified using extended Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas. In a second step, we use a SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) to verify whether OAuth violates these properties. As a result, we reveal three attacks which steal and falsify users´ critical information.
  • Keywords
    authorisation; formal verification; specification languages; ASLan++; AVANTSSAR platform; Facebook; Google; LTL formula; OAuth verification; SAT-based model checker; SATMC; Twitter; formal methods; linear temporal logic; open authorization standard; security property; third-party application access; Authentication; Authorization; Browsers; Facebook; Protocols; Servers; ASLan++; Modeling; Oauth; SATMC; Verification;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 2015 IEEE 16th International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Daytona Beach Shores, FL
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-8110-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/HASE.2015.20
  • Filename
    7027417