DocumentCode
3397327
Title
ANON: an IP-layer anonymizing infrastructure
Author
Cheng, Chen-Mou ; Kung, H.T. ; Tan, Koan-Sin ; Bradner, Scott
Volume
2
fYear
2003
fDate
22-24 April 2003
Firstpage
78
Abstract
This paper demonstrates an IP-layer anonymizing infrastructure, called ANON, which allows server addresses to be hidden from clients and vice versa. In providing address anonymity, ANON uses a network resident set of IP-layer anonymizing forwarders that can forward IP packets with nested encryption and decryption applied to their source and destination addresses. To prevent adversaries from compromising the anonymity by learning the forwarding path, ANON incorporates a suite of countermeasures, including link padding and non-malleable, semantically secure link encryption. To prevent denial of service (DoS) attacks through the anonymizing infrastructure itself ANON uses rate limiting. Finally, to increase the resilience against attacks and infrastructure failures, ANON uses redundant forwarders with anycast addresses and a fault-tolerant overlay network to connect forwarders.
Keywords
Internet; client-server systems; cryptography; data privacy; fault tolerant computing; protocols; ANON; DoS attacks; IP packets; IP-layer anonymizing infrastructure; Internet; address anonymity; anonymizing forwarders; anycast addresses; client address hiding; countermeasures; decryption; denial of service; fault-tolerant overlay network; infrastructure failures; link padding; nested encryption; network resident set; nonmalleable encryption; rate limiting; redundant forwarders; semantically secure link encryption; server address hiding; Computer crime; Cryptography; Fault tolerance; Monitoring; Network servers; Probes; Tagging; Telecommunication traffic; Timing; Traffic control;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition, 2003. Proceedings
Print_ISBN
0-7695-1897-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/DISCEX.2003.1194926
Filename
1194926
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